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Abstract
This paper examines a model of trusted computing
wherein a computing platform is able to make assertions
about its current software configuration that may be trusted
by the user and remote third parties. The privacy implica-
tions of this approach are investigated in the context of the
Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA) specification.
The trust relationships of the TCPA architecture are exam-
ined in detail. An analysis of the revocation requirements
inherent in the TCPA design is presented, which highlights
the challenges that revocation presents in the context of a
large scale deployment of TCPA platforms. Finally, a mod-
ification to the specification is suggested that reduces the
level of trust that need to be placed on the Privacy CA.
Keywords: Trusted computing, TCPA, privacy.
1 Introduction
As the degree of dependence on networked computing
devices continues to accelerate, there is a growing aware-
ness of a substantial gulf that stands between the most basic,
prudent standards of security and reliability for such critical
systems and that which is actually delivered. Put more suc-
cinctly, our computers currently cannot be trusted to do their
jobs properly. This situation has a number of unfortunate
and undesirable consequences for safety and the continued
growth and prosperity of an information based economy.
The openness and flexibility of the personal computer
and popular commercial operating systems have been im-
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portant factors supporting their widespread adoption. How-
ever, that very same openness and flexibility is proving to be
a double edged sword, since it reduces trustworthiness. We
use the word trust in the same sense as the definition in [6]
- “A trusted component, operation, or process is one whose
behaviour is predictable under almost any operating condi-
tion and which is highly resistant to subversion by applica-
tion software, viruses, and a given level of physical inter-
ference.” By openness and flexibility we mean the capabil-
ity of the computing platform to execute arbitrary software.
This may include malicious code that has been designed to
access the resources of other programs.
Networked PCs are a vital part of modern commercial
and critical infrastructures. However, in terms of delivering
dependable and secure functionality, networked PCs based
on popular commercial operating systems are deficient in
two key areas. They are unable to provide a trusted path
for input of sensitive information and they are unable to en-
sure the integrity of stored security critical information such
as cryptographic keys [8]. More generally, they are unable
to ensure the separation of mutually distrustful applications
executing on the same device. This is a direct consequence
of design decisions that have favoured flexibility, extensi-
bility and ease of use over reliability and trustworthy oper-
ation.
There are two aspects of trustworthiness that are desir-
able for networked computing platforms. Firstly, the plat-
form owner and user should be able to trust the configura-
tion of the platform, e.g., that it is not running malicious or
unauthorised software that could compromise sensitive in-
formation. This requires a combination of operating system
and hardware features that ensure reliable process separa-
tion and careful observance of the principle of least privi-
lege [8]. Secondly, a platform should be able to attest infor-
mation about its current configuration to another platform in
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a manner that the second platform can trust [3]. The second
aspect allows an entity to authenticate the software config-
uration of a platform that is not under its control. In the
case of open computing devices, this is necessary if a re-
mote third party wishes to stipulate a policy or conditions
attached to the disclosure of digital information and have
some reasonable assurance that the policy conditions will be
enforced. Policy contingent information disclosure is useful
in many different contexts. A commonly cited and some-
what controversial example is Digital Rights Management
(DRM). DRM seeks to allow an owner of copyright pro-
tected works in electronic form to control how their content
is used and transfered via devices that are not under their
control. Another example is protecting the confidentiality
of sensitive information such as medical records when they
are released to third parties.
The first aspect of trustworthiness reflects principles of
computer security that have been understood for over three
decades [9], though they have been given little priority out-
side of military systems developed in the 1970’s and 80’s.
The second aspect, remote attestation, is a more recent con-
cept. It is an important feature of the Trusted Computing
Platform Alliance (TCPA) Specification [10] which is dis-
cussed in the following sections of this paper.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
objectives of the TCPA architecture, and describes the oper-
ation of key functions including integrity protected booting,
protected storage, sealed storage and remote attestation. We
also make a number of observations on the extent to which
TCPA realises the goals of trusted computing. Section 3
examines TCPA’s credential system and privacy protection
model in detail. Deployment challenges inherent in the PKI
design that the TCPA architecture requires are discussed,
particularly with regard to key revocation. Section 4 high-
lights a number of problematic design choices in the TCPA
specification and suggests simple improvements that pos-
sess superior characteristics in terms of robustness and re-
quiring reduced levels of trust in the Privacy CA.
2 Trusted Computing Platform Alliance
(TCPA)
The TCPA was formed in 1999 by Compaq, Hewlett-
Packard, IBM, Intel and Microsoft. The TCPA architecture
has been designed with a range of devices in mind including
PCs, laptops, servers, PDAs and mobile phones. The TCPA
is a significant initiative in the development of networked
computing devices, particularly because of its broad support
from dominant industry players.
The key objective of the TCPA specification is to im-
prove the trustworthiness and security of computing plat-
forms. The novelty of the architecture lies in the range of
entities that are able to use TCPA features as a basis for
trust. These include not only the platform user and owner,
but remote entities wishing to interact with the platform.
The mechanism of remote attestation allows remote third
parties to challenge the platform to report details of its cur-
rent software state. On the basis of the attestation, third
parties can decide whether they consider the platform to be
trustworthy.
A closely related objective is to provide reliable, hard-
ware based protection for secrets such as passwords and
cryptographic keys. Since open computing platforms can
run arbitrary software, this objective aims to ensure that
protected secrets will not be revealed unless the platform’s
software state meets clearly defined and accurately mea-
surable criteria. This objective aims to provide protection
against malicious code, a critical aspect of engendering trust
in open platforms.
2.1 How TCPA Trusted Computing Works
This section explains the TCPA specification in the con-
text of a PC implementation. Details will vary for different
types of platforms such as mobile phones and PDAs though
the basic concepts will remain the same.
2.1.1 Architectural Modifications
The architectural modifications required by the TCPA spec-
ification include the addition of a cryptographic processor
chip to the motherboard, called a Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM). The TPM must be a fixed part of the device that
cannot (easily) be transferred to another platform. The TPM
provides a range of cryptographic primitives including ran-
dom number generation, SHA-1 hashing, HMAC-SHA-1,
asymmetric encryption and decryption, signing and verifi-
cation using 2048 bit RSA, and asymmetric key pair gener-
ation. There is also a a small amount of protected storage
for keys.
Under the current TCPA Protection Profile [11] the TPM
is required to be tamper evident as opposed to tamper re-
sistant. The Protection Profile does not require resistance
against power analysis [7], a powerful class of non-invasive
attacks that can recover protected cryptographic keys by
analysing the processor’s power consumption. Power anal-
ysis attacks do not necessarily leave any signs of tampering.
In section 3.2 we discuss the implications of this for TCPA’s
key revocation requirements.
2.1.2 Integrity Measurement and Reporting
TCPA security services build on an integrity protected boot
sequence that was introduced by Arbaugh [2]. Integrity pro-
tected booting is fundamental to the design of the TCPA ar-
chitecture. The boot process starts in a defined state with ex-
ecution of the BIOS boot block code. The BIOS boot block
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is called the Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM).
Since it starts the booting and measurement process, it is
implicitly trusted. The core idea in integrity protected boot-
ing is that executable code and associated configuration data
should be measured before it is executed. Accordingly, the
CRTM takes a hash of the BIOS code and stores the value in
the TPM in a Platform Configuration Register (PCR). PCRs
cannot be deleted or overwritten within a boot cycle. They
are update only using a simple chained hash technique.
The CRTM then passes control to the BIOS code and
the boot process continues following the same pattern. If
any executable stage in this chain has been modified, the
change will be reflected in the hash value. Since the PCRs
can only be updated, the modification cannot be designed to
hide itself when it is given control of the CPU.
TCPA supports two modes of booting, authenticated
boot and secure boot. In the latter mode, the platform owner
can define expected PCR values that are stored in special
TPM registers. If a PCR value does not match the expected
value for that stage of the boot process, the boot can be ter-
minated. Authenticated boot does not check actual values
against expected values.
2.1.3 TCPA, DRM and Software Licence Enforcement
The TCPA initiative has attracted a degree of controversy,
particularly in regard to digital rights management and soft-
ware licence enforcement applications. It is worth clarify-
ing that the TCPA specification itself, does not allow a third
party to control which operating system and application
software a platform owner can run. Therefore, the archi-
tecture does not provide a mechanism for software licence
enforcement where a platform boot can be terminated by a
third party, (perhaps the software licensor) if usage condi-
tions are not met, (e.g. the licence has expired). However, it
is possible to implement an operating system or application
that uses TCPA features to terminate OS booting or appli-
cation loading on the instruction of a third party. Similarly,
TCPA features can be used by applications to implement
highly restrictive DRM regimes, capable of censorship and
the erosion of fair use rights, as has been pointed out by
Anderson [1]. The requirements of DRM applications have
been considered in the TCPA architecture design [4] but it
is up to the implementers of operating systems and applica-
tion software to choose (or not) to build systems with these
features. The TCPA specification does not provide them.
2.1.4 TCPA and Operating System Security
TCPA assumes a system can be trusted if the PCR registers
match values expected by a relying party. The expected val-
ues must be those of a known secure configuration. This as-
sumes that a secure and trustworthy configuration actually
exists. As we discussed in Section 1, current commercial
operating systems are not trustworthy due to poor process
separation, insecure memory management, non-observance
of the principle of least privilege, and lack of a trusted path
for input and output [8].
TCPA will not make such operating systems secure. It
will merely allow reliable identification of an insecure con-
figuration. TCPA does not correct flawed (from a security
perspective), operating system designs or solve code quality
problems.
2.1.5 Protected Storage
The TPM can be used to protect cryptographic keys from
compromise by malicious software. TCPA provides greatly
enhanced protection for signing keys without requiring any
modifications to current operating systems. This is because
the TPM can generate signing only key pairs and perform all
signing operations itself, not releasing the key. The TPM
does not do bulk symmetric encryption. Rather, it stores
symmetric encryption keys, releasing them to the operating
system environmentwhen the required authentication infor-
mation is provided. Once released, the keys are reliant on
the protection of the operating system.
2.1.6 Sealed Storage
Sealed storage allows the release of a protected key to be
conditional on the current status of PCR registers. Access
to protected objects can therefore be conditional on the soft-
ware state. The required PCR values can be defined in
two ways. Firstly, an object can be tied to the PCR val-
ues current at the time the object was sealed. Secondly, a
third party can define the required PCR values, which al-
lows them to stipulate the necessary software environment
for the key to be released. In the context of a DRM ap-
plication, this would allow them to send encrypted content
with the knowledge that it will not be accessible unless the
platform is configured according to their wishes.
3 TCPA Remote Attestation and Privacy
Protection Model
The TPM has a key pair called the endorsement key pair
that is set at the time of manufacture. This key pair cannot
be changed or erased and the private key is never released to
the outside by the TPM. A so-called TPM Entity (TPME),
normally the manufacturer, provides a certificate of the en-
dorsement public key called the endorsement credential.
The endorsement key pair is unique to the TPM and, hence,
its use in transactions with other parties would provide a
means of unambiguously identifying the TPM. In order to
protect the privacy of the trusted platform, the TCPA speci-
fication defines a pseudonymous identity credential scheme
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in which the endorsement credential is used by the TPM to
obtain multiple identity credentials from Privacy Certifica-
tion Authorities (CAs). The endorsement key pair is only
used in the identity credential request protocol. It cannot
be used for general transactions. An identity credential is a
certificate by a Privacy CA on an identity public key gener-
ated by the TPM. The privacy afforded by the scheme relies
on the trusted mediation of the Privacy CA who knows the
binding between the platform identifiers (the endorsement
credential) and the issued (pseudonymous) identities.
Remote attestation allows a TCPA platform to assert the
state of its current software environment and its status as a
genuine TCPA platform to a third party. An identity key
pair is used to sign current PCR values. A TCPA platform
seeking service from a provider can be challenged by the
provider to attest on its current configuration. The provider
avails the service once satisfied that the TCPA platform
is genuine, and that the current software environment is a
trusted one. Different identity keys can be used by the TPM
in different remote attestations to protect its anonymity.
3.1 Identity Credentials
In order to obtain an identity credential from a Privacy
CA, a TCPA platform must show the following three cre-
dentials:
1. A TPM endorsement credential signed by a TPME that
attests that the identified TPM is genuine;
2. A platform credential signed by a Platform Entity (PE)
(e.g. the platform manufacturer) that vouches that the
TPM identified in the endorsement credential has been
integrated into a platform that conforms to design;
3. A conformance credential signed by a Conformance
Entity (CE) attesting that the TPM and platform de-
signs conform with the TCPA specification.
Figure 1 shows a simplified version of the identity cre-
dential issuing protocol run between the trusted platform
(TP) and the Privacy CA (PCA). Firstly, the TPM gener-
ates a new identity key pair ( ,  ). The public
identity key   is then sent to the Privacy CA together
with the endorsement, platform and conformance creden-
tials, denoted by 	
, 	
 and 		
, respec-
tively. In order to bind the request to the identity key pair,
the TPM uses   to generate a signature on ,
which includes a hash of the Privacy CA’s public key and
 . The signature is attached to the request. On receipt
of the request, the Privacy CA verifies the submitted creden-
tials and the signature. If the verification is successful, the
Privacy CA proceeds to create the identity credential, essen-
tially a certificate on   signed by the Privacy CA. The
identity credential is then sent to the TP encrypted under
the endorsement public key  of the TPM. Encryp-
tion of the credential ensures that only the TPM identified
in the identity request can successfully obtain the creden-
tial. Further protection is achieved by a mechanism in the
TPM that only allows the decryption of identity credentials
whose request originated in the TPM itself.
1.         , 	
, 	
, 		
,
   
2.       	   	

Figure 1. Identity Credential Issuing Protocol
3.2 Credential Revocation
As discussed in Sect. 2.1.1, the current TPM Protection
Profile does not require a TPM to be tamper resistant, only
tamper evident. Therefore, attacks that result in the com-
promise of the endorsement secret key (or any other key)
should be expected to occur frequently, when trusted plat-
forms are used, for example, in high value transactions or
DRM applications. Recovery of this key allows attackers
to create a virtual trusted platform that is entirely under
their control. Publication of a valid endorsement key pair
would allow widespread impersonation of the trusted plat-
form, without the trust.
The TCPA specification acknowledges that “the trust-
worthiness of the architecture is vulnerable to the compro-
mise of a single TPM endorsement private key”; however,
no provision for credential revocation is included. It is
clearly important that endorsement credentials can be re-
voked for TCPA to realise its full potential. Privacy CAs
need to confirm that an endorsement credential has not been
revoked before they issue an identity credential based on
it. Similarly, service providers may need to confirm that
a pseudonymous identity has not been revoked before they
rely on it.
The specification also claims that “certain forms of re-
vocation scheme can be retrofitted, should it become neces-
sary at some time in the future.” We notice, however, that
the current specification severely hinders the deployment of
any mechanism capable of addressing the revocation of cre-
dentials in an efficient and effective manner. To see this,
we firstly must appreciate the complexity inherent to cer-
tificate revocation, a task that is proving itself to be a major
challenge for the successful deployment of public key in-
frastructures (PKIs). Scenarios in which credentials may
need to be revoked include the following.
1. A TPM endorsement private key is compromised.
Then, the endorsement credential and any associated
identities credentials have to be revoked.
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2. An identity private key is compromised. Then, de-
pending on the revocation policies being implemented
by the different CAs, different scenarios are possible,
including the following:
(a) The corresponding TPM endorsement credential
is also deemed compromised and revocation is
effected as in scenario 1.
(b) All associated identity credentials within the
same issuing Privacy CA need to be revoked.
(c) Only the compromised identity credential re-
quires revocation.
These scenarios represent a subset of the potential situations
that require revocation of credentials. Other circumstances
that would result in revocation are the compromise of the
signing keys of entities such as manufacturers or CAs.
The propagation of revocation amongst associated cre-
dentials adds complexity to the revocationmechanismwhen
compared with traditional PKIs. It not only increases the
amount of certificates that need to be revoked within the in-
frastructure, but also demands extra functionality to allow
credentials that are associated to be traceable. The above
revocation scenarios show that there are situations in which
it may be required to find the endorsement credential be-
hind a given identity credential, as well as to find all the
identity credentials within the domain of a Privacy CA that
are associated to a given identity credential.
Informally, we can define the security requirements
needed to support traceability of credentials as follows.
  Revocable Anonymity: It should not be possible for
anyone (except for a designated Privacy CA ) to link an
identity credential to the associated endorsement cre-
dential.
  Revocable Unlinkability: It should not be possible for
anyone (except for a designated Privacy CA) to link
any two associated identity credentials.
We say that the credential scheme provides credential trace-
ability if it satisfies the above two properties. Clearly, the
capability to revoke anonymity implies the capability to re-
voke unlinkability. The Privacy CA acts as a revocation au-
thority that can be called upon in special circumstances, e.g.
as part of the credential revocation process, to reveal the
binding between credentials.
We can further qualify the (anonymity and unlinkability)
revocation process as strong or weak depending on whether
the Privacy CA can provide cryptographic proof of the link
between credentials. The current TCPA architecture pro-
vides weak traceability, i.e. it allows Privacy CAs to revoke
the anonymity (and hence the unlinkability) of identity cre-
dentials, but no proof can be produced by the Privacy CA
to demonstrate the link between them. The Privacy CA
is trusted to claim only genuine mappings between issued
identity credentials and TPMs. This trust, if violated, al-
lows the Privacy CA to frame a TPM by asserting an incor-
rect mapping. If an identity key was used for misbehaviour,
a service provider could request revocation of the associ-
ated TPM endorsement credential. If the evidence of mis-
behaviour were sufficient, the Privacy CA could claim an
incorrect mapping resulting in revocation of an ‘innocent’
TPM. In Sect. 4 we show that strong traceability can be ob-
tained at very little extra-cost.
Bearing in mind the intricacies of credential revocation,
it is not difficult to resolve that the decision by the TCPA
to only require tamper evidence for TPM chips complicates
the retrofitting of any revocation mechanism; for it consid-
erably increases the number of credential revocations due to
key compromise that the mechanism must deal with. Simi-
larly, the lack of strong credential traceability predetermines
a revocation scheme which places unnecessary trust on Pri-
vacy CAs, thus limiting the scheme’s robustness.
4 Minimising the Trust on the Privacy CA
Credential authenticity is the most basic security require-
ment for any credential system. It should not be possible
for any user to generate a credential without the approval
of the corresponding trust provider. In the TCPA architec-
ture, the trust providers for the endorsement, platform and
conformance credentials are the TPME, the PE and the CE,
respectively. The possession of these certificates by a TCPA
platform is what enables service providers to trust the attes-
tation process. As explained in Sect. 3.1, possession of the
credentials is not proved directly to the service provider, but
indirectly through the Privacy CA. Hence, service providers
must trust that the Privacy CA will not issue identities to
non-genuine TPMs.
Since the reason for including Privacy CAs in the TCPA
architecture is the provision of privacy to platforms, it ap-
pears that the additional reliance on the Privacy CA to check
the authenticity of the credentials is an undesirable side
effect of the design. Therefore an alternative credential
scheme without the extra trust on the Privacy CA would
be preferable. This is in line with the general security de-
sign principle of minimising the trust vested on third parties,
which results in more robust schemes and for which crypto-
graphic techniques are mainly employed. Anonymous cre-
dential schemes are an active area of research. Recent pro-
posals such as those by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [5] and
Verheul [12] deserve further investigation as to their suit-
ability to the TCPA environment.
As pointed out in Section 3.2, Privacy CAs cannot prove
that an identity credential that they have issued was actu-
ally requested by the TPM with the matching endorsement
credential. As a consequence, Privacy CAs cannot be made
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accountable for the fabrication of illegitimate identity cre-
dentials. This can be easily fixed by modifying the identity
credential issuing protocol so that the requesting TPM gen-
erates a signature using the endorsement private key to bind
the requested identity credential to the endorsement creden-
tial. For example, the signature from the original protocol
(Figure 1) could be replaced by
             	
 
The Privacy CA would now have to verify both signatures
and store them in case it needs to show proof of the bind-
ing between the identity and endorsement credentials. The
modified protocol is shown in Figure 2.
1.     ,  , , ,
            
	

2.     
Figure 2. Modified Identity Credential Issuing
Protocol
5 Conclusions
We have reviewed the motivations that are driving a re-
newed interest in trusted computing, an area that was stud-
ied extensively in the 1970s and 80s but has received very
little attention until the recent surge of awareness created by
the release of the TCPA specification.
We have described the objectives of the TCPA architec-
ture and reviewed key aspects of its functionality. This has
included observations on the extent to which TCPA deliv-
ers important trusted computing features. While the TCPA
specification is an important step toward the goal of trusted
computing, it only provides part of the solution. The im-
proved protection for signing keys and reliable platform au-
thentication features are of immediate benefit. However,
TCPA does not address more fundamental requirements for
trust that can only be delivered by an appropriately designed
operating system.
We have reviewed TCPA’s credential system and privacy
protection model in which the Privacy CA plays a critical
role. We presented a detailed analysis of the revocation re-
quirements inherent in the TCPA design, highlighting the
practical challenge that revocation presents in this context.
We explored ways of reducing the trust that must be placed
on the Privacy CA, and provided concrete suggestions to
achieve this goal.
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